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With the rapid improvement of urbanization and industrialization in countries around the world,
how to effectively solve the rapid demise of traditional villages is a social dilemma faced by all
countries, which is why a series of relevant protection regulations have been promulgated in
different historical periods. However, the formulation of relevant policies is still not scientiﬁc,
universal, and long-term. In this study, we constructed an evolutionary game model of local
governments and residents based on the evolutionary game theory (EGT), which is used to explore
the evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) and stability conditions of stakeholders under the premise
of mutual inﬂuence and restriction. Besides, the study also includes the analysis about the impacts
of different inﬂuence factors on the evolution tendency of the game model. At the same time,
numerical simulation examples were used to verify the theoretical results and three crucial conclusions have been drawn. Firstly, the strategic evolution of stakeholders is a dynamic process of
continuous adjustment and optimization, and its results and speed show consistent interdependence. Secondly, the decision-making of stakeholders mainly depends on the basic cost, and the
high cost of investment is not conducive to the protection of traditional villages. Thirdly, the
dynamic evolutionary mechanism composed of different inﬂuence factors will have an impact on
the direction and speed of decision-making of stakeholders, which provides the basis for them to
effectively restrict the decision-making of each other. This study eliminates the weaknesses of
existing research approaches and provides scientiﬁc and novel ideas for the protection of traditional villages, which can contribute to the formulation and improvement of the relevant laws and
regulations.

1. Introduction
Traditional villages refer to the villages with material and non-material cultural heritage, which have a high level of historical,
cultural, scientiﬁc, artistic, economic, and social values (Chai et al., 2022). However, due to the problems of unsustainable economic
beneﬁts, incomplete understanding on the value of villages and low participation of residents, traditional villages have faced many
difﬁculties in recent years, such as constructive destruction and regional regression (Xiao and Fan, 2022). Thus, how to effectively
protect and perpetuate the value of traditional villages has become a common problem faced by countries around the world. Research
Center of Chinese Village Culture (https://village.csu.edu.cn/wzsy.htm) conducted a survey (Ma and Tong, 2022) on traditional villages
in the Yangtze River, the Yellow River, and Southwest China, then found that traditional villages decreased at an average rate of 7.3%/a.
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Moreover, in 2014, a random survey of 1033 traditional villages revealed that only 572 villages survived, with the disappearance rate of
about 44.6% (Ma and Tong, 2022). In fact, the disappearance of traditional villages far exceeds this data on a national scale. In addition,
according to data of the China Statistical Yearbook during 2000–2020 (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2000–2020), the number
of natural villages has declined sharply by 1.0  106 from 1999 to 2020 in China, while the number of existing traditional villages with
high cultural value is even fewer (Fig. 1). It is evident that the task for the protection of traditional villages is very urgent in China.
For the sake of protecting and perpetuating traditional villages as a world cultural heritage, countries all over the world are actively
participating in protection work. The protection of traditional villages internationally has experienced a gradual deepening process,
which can be divided into four historical stages. Historical heritage protection in the modern meaning of the term ﬁrst began in the 15th
century during the Renaissance, when the protection of heritage architecture was established as a specialized subject (Zeayter and
Mansour, 2018). The second stage was the end of the 18th century, in which the protection and restoration of historical heritage began to
attract widespread social attention (Nasser, 2003). The third stage was from the mid-late 19th century to the early 20th century, during
which a series of related protection institutes, legislation, and principles were formed (Spencer, 1997), such as the Historic Buildings
Authority (1840) established in French, the Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings (1877) created in England, the Antiquities
Preservation Act (1906) enacted in the United States, and the Athens Charter (1931) proposed by the International Institute of Modern
Architecture. The fourth stage was from the mid-late 20th century to the early 21st century, during which a series of theoretical innovations and practical explorations have been conducted on the protection and utilization of traditional villages and historical
buildings (Chen et al., 2019), such as the Recommendation Concerning the Safeguarding of the Beauty and Character of Landscapes and
Sites (1962) and the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (1972) proposed by the United
Nations Educational, Scientiﬁc and Cultural Organization, the Tlaxcala Declaration (1982) presented by the International Council on
Monuments and Sites, and the ﬁrst International Conference on the Conservation and Development of Traditional Villages (2017)
organized in China. It is evident from these initiatives that countries around the world are attaching increasing importance to the
protection of traditional villages, which has become a general consensus of governments and societies. In the past decade or so, although
China has implemented several measures on protecting traditional villages based on foreign protection experiences, such as the First
Traditional Chinese Villages Catalog (2012) promulgated by Chinese government departments and the Strategic Plan for Rural Revitalization (2018–2022) issued by the Ofﬁce of Central Rural Work Leading Group Ofﬁce in 2018, the current situation of traditional
villages is still not optimistic. One of the important reason for this is the lack of a scientiﬁc, universal, and stable basis to guide the
development and implementation of relevant policies, so this paper draws on the research methodology of evolutionary game theory
(EGT) (Samuelson, 2002; Shubik, 2002) to help overcome this challenge. At present, EGT has made an important contribution to solving
the problems of resource protection and economic development (Tian et al., 2014), and in the same way, it provides a new breakthrough
approach to solve the challenges about the protection of traditional villages.
EGT constructs a dynamic system of participants interaction based on the premise of game theory and bounded rationality, which
can be used to describe the evolutionary process of dynamically interacting behavior under the conditions of mutual interest constraint
(Weibull, 1997). Evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) (Smith and Price, 1973; Smith, 1974) and replicator dynamics (Taylor and Jonker,
1978) are the concepts and method that are commonly used in EGT. ESS indicates that, the more adaptive individuals in the system are
the more likely to be retained with evolution of time (Geritz et al., 1998), and ultimately, individual strategies maintain at an ideal stable
state. The basic idea is to use a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods to explore the future trends and directions of the
system in an incomplete information state. The basic model for the protection of traditional villages is insisting on government guidance
and public participation, and the behavior of the two stakeholders to maximize the interests seriously restricts the implementation of the
protection policy. The idea of EGT ﬁts the situation that interests of stakeholders on the protection of traditional villages impact and
constrain each other (Fig. 2). Thus, the innovative introduction of EGT into the study is helpful to formulate and improve laws and
regulations for the protection of traditional villages, and is of great signiﬁcance for the protection of historical and cultural heritage.
Based on the above considerations, this paper focuses on the protection of traditional villages, and the main research content is the

Fig. 1. A schematic diagram of the number and reduction rate of natural villages in China during 2000–2020. Data were collected from the China
Statistical Yearbook (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2000–2020).
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dynamic process and trend of stakeholders’ strategy evolution. The applied research method is the combination of EGT, multidisciplinary theory integration, and simulation technology. The novelties and contributions of this paper are mainly represented in four
aspects. First, this paper constructs a dynamic evolutionary mechanism through partial beneﬁts assessment indicators (Liu et al., 2022)
and contributes to the analysis of the impact of speciﬁc assessment indicators on decision-making, including but not limited to these
main assessment indicators mentioned in this paper. Second, through clear and complete analysis on the complex interaction of interests
between local governments and residents, this paper lays the foundation for the construction of interest coordination mechanism. Third,
this study scientiﬁcally and rationally explains and predicts the dynamic decision-making processes and the trend of groups through
simulation analysis. Fourth, the approach adopted can eliminate mutations and is stable. For villages where the protection work is
currently well done, it can quickly and accurately ﬁnd the best solution for group decision-making by constructing game models and
simulation analysis when relevant inﬂuence factors are mutated.
2. Research status of relevant literature
This paper reviews relevant literature in terms of the research status on the protection of traditional villages and the application of
EGT in recent years.

2.1. Research status on the protection of traditional villages
Through reviewing a large amount of literature, it is found that the attention and investment of governments on the protection of
traditional villages have promoted research enthusiasm of related academic circles, leading to the continuous expansion of related
research ﬁelds (Dressler and Roth, 2011). The research perspective gradually tends to diversify from natural elements to economic
 cic et al., 2021), the transformation about the social structure of villages (Li
elements, such as the study on rural economic system (Cur
et al., 2019), and the planning of strategies to protect villages (Pola, 2019; Silvetti et al., 2020). The research content has transformed
from focusing on the material entities of traditional villages to the comprehensive study of human living environment and social issues,
such as the study on habitat and environment of traditional villages (Wang and Chiou, 2019), the active social participation (Lepp, 2007;
Bello et al., 2018), and the hollowing out of traditional villages (Ye, 2018). The research methodology is mainly from qualitative to the
combination of qualitative and quantitative, and then to the trend of multidisciplinary integration; for example, the existing research
results are mostly based on the multidisciplinary integration of architecture (Fatimah, 2018; Palliyaguru et al., 2018), geography (Xu
et al., 2021), history (Qin and Leung, 2021), sociology (Kurtz, 2015), and anthropology (West and Brockington, 2006).
Overseas research on the protection of traditional villages began in the middle of the 19th century, and many countries such as the
United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, began to protect traditional villages through the introduction of relevant policies and
regulations, making scholars to investigate in-depth (Sambu and Wilson, 2008). Through the analysis on the protection process of
traditional villages, existing problems in local protection policies and planning are elaborated (Stevens and Shin, 2014). According to
interviews and surveys on the needs of different groups, residents and experts have certain cognition differences on the protection of
traditional villages (Taylor, 2019). With the simple study of contradictory relationships between subjects involved in traditional villages, Yalçınkaya (2015) proposed optimization strategies for subjects. Compared with western countries, research on the protection of
traditional villages in China started late, and it was mainly based on foreign studies and detailed research of speciﬁc areas. For instance,
taking the protection and restoration of San Juan Indian traditional villages as an example, Huang and Dong (2017) found that governments should actively reach a consensus with residents on the protection planning of traditional villages. Through comparing
different practices about the protection of traditional villages in developed countries and China, Wu et al. (2018) summarized the
successes, gaps, and weaknesses of Chinese policies. Besides, the exploration of overall protection and development of architectural
heritage was launched on the basis of the Rural Revitalization Strategy (Yan and Zhao, 2021).
With regard to the perspective and content of this study, the existing research approaches have the following four weaknesses according to a large number of research results. First, most of the methodologies adopted for the protection of traditional villages in China
and abroad are research census and case study, which are not extensive and universal for many traditional villages with different
challenges. Second, since local governments often formulate strategies based on theoretical analysis and empirical reference on the

Fig. 2. Mutual inﬂuence and restriction between local governments and residents.
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interests of the single subject, it is difﬁcult to judge the conﬂicts of interests among core stakeholders, resulting in a lack of scientiﬁc
theoretical guidance for the formulation of relevant laws and regulations. Third, the existing research approaches are rarely able to
predict the future trend of current strategies in a scientiﬁc and reasonable way, and only focus on the current beneﬁt assessment, which
are not long-term in nature. Fourth, for a well-handled traditional village at present, that is, when the strategies of groups evolve into a
stable manner, the existing research approaches are difﬁcult for groups to quickly and scientiﬁcally analyze the consequences and make
strategy adjustments if there are sudden changes in one or more relevant factors impacting the group decision-making, therefore, they
are not stable.
2.2. Research status on the application of evolutionary game theory (EGT)
Cooperation is the basis for successful social evolution. In recent years, numerous related studies have turned their attention to a
range of topics to explore potential threats to society, especially complex social issues, such as sustainable development (Jusup et al.,
2022). One of the important approaches to study the real cooperation problems is EGT, which is a theory that combines the game theory
and dynamic evolutionary process; in terms of methodology, it emphasizes a dynamic equilibrium, which is different from classical
game theory that focuses on static equilibrium and comparative statics (Helbing et al., 2015; Jusup et al., 2022). In the current global
era, the emergence of various social issues is a complex and dynamic process, so it is more reasonable to adopt the thinking of evolution
to analyze such issues. The proposed ESS and replicator dynamics in EGT have provided a powerful analytical tool for research in
biology (Gatenby and Vincent, 2003), economy (Yang et al., 2013), social science (Xie et al., 2018), and other ﬁelds. For example, a
dynamically secure mobile crowd perception game model is proposed to explore the perceptual performance of false perception attacks
by applying a research approach combining the game theory and deep reinforcement learning (Xiao et al., 2017). Based on a replicated
dynamic approach, Jiang et al. (2019) explored the implementation of the multi-agent environmental regulation strategies under ﬁscal
decentralization in China. Moreover, different risk attitudes of governments’ supervision on product quality were analyzed by constructing an evolutionary game model for online shopping (Wen et al., 2021).
Through combing and reviewing the existing literature, it is discovered that the research on the protection of traditional villages and
the application of EGT is relatively widespread throughout the world. However, the existing research approaches to the protection of
traditional villages still have signiﬁcant weaknesses, which can be solved by the application of EGT. Therefore, the innovative introduction and improvement of EGT can not only comprehensively analyze and solve the protection issues of traditional villages, but also
have great innovative signiﬁcance and research values for solving complex social problems.
3. Evolutionary game model
3.1. Descriptions of the problem and basic assumptions
According to the regulations on the protection of traditional villages formulated in China (Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural
Development, 2014), local governments at all levels are required to be responsible for the protection of traditional villages in their
administrative areas and to strictly supervise residents, indicating that local governments and residents are the most important participants on the protection of traditional villages. The core interests of both participants are to improve their own economic and social
beneﬁts, which may lead to conﬂicts between them. Residents, as the owners of traditional villages, may engage in behavior that is not in
accordance with policies set by local governments or even destroy traditional villages in order to reduce economic losses and increase
personal revenues. Local governments are the representatives of public interests, but they have potentials to make options that damage
the rights of residents in order to increase their revenues due to their economic characteristics, which may lead to resistance behavior
when the rights of residents are not properly guaranteed.
EGT is used to set the game participants as a bounded rationality group (Jusup et al., 2022). Individuals need to constantly obtain
information from others in the game and learn or imitate each other to reform their own strategies, then eventually reach a stable state.
In other words, it is a complex and asymptotic process for the system to reach an equilibrium and stable state, so EGT can be used to
predict the long-term evolutionary tend of participant behaviors. In the dynamic system of the protection of traditional villages, participants are dynamically interacting. Speciﬁcally, they will adjust their strategies according to the deviation of their goals by constantly
comparing their beneﬁts, which is why it is very suitable to use EGT as a tool to analyze the dynamic evolution process of their strategies.
Based on the descriptions of above problems, the following three hypotheses are proposed in this paper.
H1.

The hypothesis of subjects and strategies.

To begin with, it is assumed that local governments and residents are the two decision-making subjects in the evolutionary game
model for the protection of traditional villages. Local governments primarily support and supervise the implementation of the protection
of traditional villages through the formulation of policies, while residents participate in the protection of traditional villages mainly in
coordination with local policies. Accordingly, local governments have two strategies: complete support and supervision, and partial
support and supervision, and the probabilities of the two strategies being chosen are regarded as x (0  x  1) and 1–x, respectively.
Likewise, the two strategies for residents are: full participation, and partial participation, and the probabilities of them are denoted as y
(0  y  1) and 1–y, respectively.
H2.

The hypothesis of game types and bounded rationality.

In reality, it is difﬁcult to achieve the perfect rationality and complete information of game subjects because of the limited perception
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and cognitive ability of human beings. Consequently, the evolutionary game model constructed in this paper is a dynamic game under
the assumption that both the local governments and residents are bounded rational with incomplete information, which means that both
parties follow conventional behavioral strategies in the game process and just analyze the existing strategies of each other. As for this
evolutionary game model, local governments are promoters and regulators, and residents are actual implementer, but both of them have
the common goals of minimizing costs and maximizing beneﬁts. Hence, both sides of game will choose a high payoff strategy rather than
a low payoff strategy in decision-making process, and then constantly adjust their response strategies according to the deviation of goals
towards eventually reaching a stable state of the strategy.
H3.

The hypothesis of dynamic evolutionary mechanism.

In accordance with the description of the problem and actual situation, this paper has fully considered factors inﬂuencing on the
decision-making of both game subjects, especially some quantiﬁable beneﬁt assessment indicators (Fagerholm et al., 2012; Liu et al.,
2021). Firstly, since 2008, China has implemented relevant regulations for the protection of traditional villages (State Council of the
People’s Republic of China, 2020), which explicitly requires local governments to regulate behaviors of ﬁnancial investment, maintenance and repair, subsidies and penalties, and remediation of damages on the basis of actual situations. It should be noted that the
dynamic adjustment of these behaviors constitutes the key external elements of the dynamic evolutionary mechanism here. Secondly,
some social forces, such as enterprises and institutions, can bring reputation beneﬁts to local governments through donation, investment, and shareholding based on the reputation of local governments’ actions. Afterwards, a particular feedback mechanism, such as
resistance behavior, is considered to be more realistic. Speciﬁcally, when local governments are under partial support and supervision,
the economic interests of residents will not be properly ensured, and local governments will face the risk of resistance from residents
(assuming that there is no resistance when local governments are under complete support and supervision). Lastly, due to the fact that
decision-making of stakeholders is a dynamic process of constant adjustment, subjective consciousness is an important factor to impact
decision-making. It is assumed here that the subjective consciousness of local governments inﬂuences the protection of traditional
villages in the form of different intensities of support and supervision, and residents affect the protection of traditional villages in the
form of different degrees of participation. Certainly, both dynamic inherent factors also have corresponding effects on other inﬂuencing
factors.

3.2. Construction of the evolutionary game model
3.2.1. Parameter settings
On the basis of above-mentioned problem descriptions and basic assumptions, relevant parameters of the evolutionary game model
are set in this paper, and the parameters are described in Table 1.
Table 1
Descriptions of parameters used in the evolutionary game model.
Parameter

Description

Value

x
1–x
y
1–y
C1
λ1
C2
λ2
δ

The
The
The
The
The
The
The
The
The

F
m

The maximum penalties imposed by local governments with complete support and supervision on residents with partial participation
The probability of penalties imposed by local governments with complete support and supervision on residents with partial
participation
The maximum remedial cost that needs to be paid by local governments with complete support and supervision
The maximum economic losses suffered by local governments with complete support and supervision
The maximum local cultural development beneﬁts obtained by local governments with full participation of the residents. Here, R1(t)
¼ r1(t)þη1, where r1(t) denotes the basic beneﬁts of local cultural development, and η1 represents the impact of external
environmental factors on r1(t).
The maximum reputation beneﬁts generated by local governments with full participation of residents
The maximum local cultural development losses suffered by local governments with partial participation of residents. Here, S1(t) ¼
s1(t)þη2, where s1(t) denotes the basic losses of local cultural development, and η2 represents the impact of external environmental
factors on s1(t).
The maximum reputation losses suffered by local governments with partial participation of residents
The direct economic beneﬁts of residents with full participation
The taxation rates of residents
The risk degree of residents’ resistance behavior with partial support and supervision of local governments
The cost of resistance for residents
The additional beneﬁts of the resistance for residents
The losses of resistance for local governments

0x1
01–x1
0y1
01–y1
C1  0
0 < λ1 < 1
C2  0
0 < λ2 < 1
0.0  δ 
0.5
F0
0m1

D1
S3
R1(t)

R2
S1(t)

S2
R3
φ

ω

D2
R4
S4

probability of local governments with complete support and supervision
probability of local governments with partial support and supervision
probability of residents with full participation
probability of residents with partial participation
basic cost of local governments with complete support and supervision
intensity of local governments with support and supervision
basic cost of residents with full participation
degree of residents with participation
proportion of subsidies provided by local governments to residents with complete support and supervision
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D1  0
R3  0
R1(t)0

R2  0
S1(t)0

S2  0
R3  0
0φ1
0<ω<1
D2  0
R4  0
S4  0
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(1) Key parameter settings that impact decision-making on both sides of the evolutionary game model.
Under the fundamental assumption H3, the basic cost of local governments with complete support and supervision is C1, and the
intensity of local governments with support and supervision is λ1 (0 < λ1 < 1). Similarly, the basic cost of residents with full participation
is C2, and the degree of residents with participation is considered as λ2 (0 < λ2 < 1). Local governments interact with residents primarily
through ﬁnancial subsidies and penalties. The proportion of subsidies provided by local governments to residents with complete support
and supervision is deﬁned as δ (0.0  δ  0.5), because the “Save the Old House Action” project stipulates that local governments should
subsidize no more than 50.0% of the total cost to residents (State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2022). Thus, the maximum
amount of subsidies provided by local governments is δC2, and it is speciﬁed that the amount of subsidies is affected by λ1. On the other
hand, this paper assumes that the maximum penalties imposed by local governments with complete support and supervision on residents
with partial participation is F, and the probability of penalties is m (0  m  1). Obviously subsidies are jointly inﬂuenced by λ1 and λ2
(here it is stipulated that residents will not be penalized with full participation).
(2) Key parameter settings that impact decision-making on local governments.
The regulations related to the protection of traditional villages stipulate that local governments should be actively responsible for
implementing remedial measures when villages are damaged (State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2020). Therefore, the
maximum remedial cost that needs to be paid by local governments with complete support and supervision is assumed to be D1 (D1 ¼
0 with full participation of residents is deﬁned here), which is obviously impacted by both λ1 and λ2. It can be seen from the reality that
local governments are bound to suffer economic losses when implementing complete support and supervision. Hence, it is assumed that
the maximum economic losses suffered by local governments with complete support and supervision is denoted as S3, which is only
impacted by λ1. Since the development of traditional villages will bring economic beneﬁts to local governments, this paper mainly
considers the maximum local cultural development beneﬁts (R1(t)) obtained and the maximum reputation beneﬁts (R2) generated by
local governments with full participation of residents. The value of traditional villages is a critical internal factor determining the
beneﬁts of local cultural development, which has a complex evaluation system and is inﬂuenced by multiple external environmental
factors. To simplify the calculation, it is assumed here that R1(t) ¼ r1(t)þη1, where r1(t) denotes the basic beneﬁts of local cultural
development, and η1 represents the inﬂuence of external environmental factors on r1(t). Likewise, the maximum local cultural development losses and the maximum reputation losses suffered by local governments with partial participation of residents are set as S1(t)
and S2, respectively. S1(t) can be calculated as: S1(t) ¼ s1(t)þη2, where s1(t) denotes the basic losses of local cultural development, and η2
represents the impact of external environmental factors on s1(t). It is clear that the beneﬁts and losses of local cultural development and
reputation are jointly affected by λ1 and λ2.
(3) Key parameter settings that impact decision-making on residents.
Firstly, it is assumed in this paper that the direct economic beneﬁts of residents with full participation is R3, which is only inﬂuenced
by λ2. The main way for residents to interact with local governments is through taxation, then, the taxation rate for residents is deﬁned as
φ (0  φ  1) and the amount of taxation paid by residents to local governments with full participation is deﬁned as (1–φ)R3. In addition,
it is also assumed that under the situation of local governments with partial support and supervision, the risk degree of residents’
resistance behavior is ω (0 < ω<1). Obviously, ω is impacted by λ1 and λ2 jointly, and it is directly assumed here that ω¼(1–λ1)λ2. When
the resistance occurs, the cost of resistance for residents is considered as D2, the additional beneﬁts of the resistance for residents is R4,
and the losses of resistance for local governments is S4.
3.2.2. Payoff matrix
According to the model assumptions, we established four different combinations of strategies in the dynamic game between local
governments and residents. The payoff matrix of the evolutionary game model is generated by analyzing different combinations of
strategies, as shown in Table 2 (LGs and REs represent the payoff of local governments and residents, respectively).
The speciﬁc strategy combinations in Table 2 are expressed as follows:
ðLGs1 ; REs1 Þ ¼ fð  C1  S3  δC2 Þ þ R1 ðtÞ þ R2 þ φR3 ; ð1  δÞC2 þ ð1  φÞR3 g;

(1)

Table 2
The payoff matrix for the evolutionary game model of traditional village protection.
Local governments

x
1–x

Residents
y

1–y

(LGs1, REs1)
(LGs3, REs3)

(LGs2, REs2)
(LGs4, REs4)

Note: LGs1, LGs2, LGs3, and LGs4 are the payoff of local governments under four different combinations of strategies. REs1, REs2, REs3, and REs4 are the
payoff of residents under four different combinations of strategies.
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ðLGs2 ; REs2 Þ ¼ fð  C1  S3  δC2 Þ þ λ2 ðR1 ðtÞ þ R2 þ φR3 Þ  ð1  λ2 ÞðD1  mF þ S1 ðtÞ þ S2 Þ; ðλ2  δÞC2 þ
λ2 ð1  φÞR3  ð1  λ2 ÞmFg;

(2)

ðLGs3 ; REs3 Þ ¼ fλ1 ð  C1  S3  δC2 þ R1 ðtÞ þ R2 Þ  ð1  λ1 ÞðS1 ðtÞ þ S2 þ S4 Þ þ φR3 ; ð1  λ1 δÞC2 þ ð1  φÞR3 þ
ð1  λ1 ÞðR4  D2 Þg;

(3)

ðLGs4 ; REs4 Þ ¼ fλ1 ð  C1  S3  δC2 Þ þ λ2 φR3 þ λ1 ð1 þ λ2 ÞðD1  mFÞ þ λ1 λ2 ðR1 ðtÞ þ R2 Þ  ð1  λ1 Þð1  λ2 ÞðS1 ðtÞ
þS2 Þ  ð1  λ1 Þλ2 S4 ; ðλ2  λ1 δÞC2 þ λ2 ð1  φÞR3  λ1 ð1  λ2 ÞmF þ ð1  λ1 Þλ2 ðR4  D2 Þg:

(4)

3.2.3. Replicator dynamic equations
The expected payoff for both local governments and residents can be obtained from the above payoff matrix. The expected payoff of
local governments with complete support and supervision (U1(x, y)), the expected payoff of local governments with partial support and
supervision (U2(x, y)), and the average expected payoff of local governments (U(x, y)) can be expressed as follows:
U1 ðx; yÞ ¼ yLGs1 þ ð1  yÞLGs2 ;

(5)

U2 ðx; yÞ ¼ yLGs3 þ ð1  yÞLGs4 ;

(6)

Uðx; yÞ ¼ xU1 ðx; yÞ þ ð1  xÞU2 ðx; yÞ:

(7)

Then, the replicator dynamic equation of local governments is expressed as:
FðxÞ ¼





 
dx
¼ x U1 ðx;yÞ  Uðx;yÞ ¼ xð1  xÞ U1 ðx;yÞ  U2 ðx;yÞ ¼ xð1  xÞ y ð1  λ1 Þð1  λ2 Þ
dt

ðD1  mF þ R1 ðtÞ þ R2 þ S4 Þ þ ð1  λ1 λ2 ÞðS1 ðtÞ þ S2 Þg  ½ð1  λ1 ÞðC1 þ S3 þ δC2 Þ þ ð1  λ1 Þð1  λ2 ÞðD1  mFÞ  ð1  λ1 Þλ2 ðR1 ðtÞ þ R2
þ S4 Þ þ λ1 ð1  λ2 ÞðS1 ðtÞ þ S2 Þg:
(8)
Therefore, the ﬁrst-order derivative of the replicator dynamic equation of local governments is expressed as:
0

F ðxÞ ¼

 
 
dFðxÞ
¼ ð1  2xÞ y ð1  λ1 Þð1  λ2 ÞðD1  mF þ R1 ðtÞ þ R2 þ S4 Þ þ ð1  λ1 λ2 ÞðS1 ðtÞ þ S2 Þ  ð1  λ1 ÞðC1
dx

(9)

þS3 þ δC2 Þ þ ð1  λ1 Þð1  λ2 ÞðD1  mFÞ  ð1  λ1 Þλ2 ðR1 ðtÞ þ R2 þ S4 Þ þ λ1 ð1  λ2 ÞðS1 ðtÞ þ S2 Þg:
To simplify the calculation, it is assumed here that:
A ¼ ð1  λ1 Þð1  λ2 Þ ðD1  mF þ R1 ðtÞ þ R2 þ S4 Þ þ ð1  λ1 λ2 ÞðS1 ðtÞ þ S2 Þ;

(10)

B ¼ ð1  λ1 ÞðC1 þ S3 þ δC2 Þ þ ð1  λ1 Þð1  λ2 ÞðD1  mFÞ  ð1  λ1 Þλ2 ðR1 ðtÞ þ R2 þ S4 Þ þ λ1 ð1  λ2 ÞðS1 ðtÞ þ S2 Þ:

(11)

Then, Equations (8) and (9) can be simpliﬁed as:
FðxÞ ¼ xð1  xÞðAy  BÞ;

(12)

0

F ðxÞ ¼ ð1  2xÞðAy  BÞ:

(13)

Similarly, the expected payoff of residents with full participation (V1(x, y)), the expected payoff of residents with partial participation
(V2(x, y)), and the average expected payoff of residents (V(x, y)) can be expressed as follows:
V1 ðx; yÞ ¼ xREs1 þ ð1  xÞREs3 ;

(14)

V2 ðx; yÞ ¼ xREs2 þ ð1  xÞREs4 ;

(15)

Vðx; yÞ ¼ yV1 ðx; yÞ þ ð1  yÞV2 ðx; yÞ:

(16)

Then, the replicator dynamic equation of residents is expressed as:
FðyÞ ¼





dy
¼ y V1 ðx; yÞ  Vðx; yÞ ¼ yð1  yÞ V1 ðx; yÞ  V2 ðx; yÞ ¼ yð1  yÞxð1  λ1 Þð1  λ2 Þ:
dt


mF  ðR4  D2 Þ  ½ð1  λ2 ÞðC2  ð1  φÞR3 Þ  ð1  λ1 Þð1  λ2 ÞðR4  D2 Þ  λ1 ð1  λ2 ÞmF

Therefore, the ﬁrst-order derivative of the replicator dynamic equation of residents is expressed as:
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dFðyÞ
¼ ð1  2yÞ xð1  λ1 Þð1  λ2 Þ mF  ðR4  D2 Þ  ð1  λ2 ÞðC2  ð1  φÞR3 Þ  ð1  λ1 Þð1  λ2 ÞðR4
dy

(18)

D2 Þ  λ1 ð1  λ2 ÞmFg:
To simplify the calculation, it is assumed here that:
C ¼ ð1  λ1 Þð1  λ2 Þ½mF  ðR4  D2 Þ;

(19)

D ¼ ð1  λ2 Þ½C2  ð1  φÞR3   ð1  λ1 Þð1  λ2 ÞðR4  D2 Þ  λ1 ð1  λ2 ÞmF:

(20)

Then, Equations (17) and (18) can be simpliﬁed as:
FðyÞ ¼ yð1  yÞðCx  DÞ;

(21)

0

F ðyÞ ¼ ð1  2yÞðCx  DÞ:

(22)

4. Equilibrium points and local asymptotic stability analysis
4.1. Analysis of equilibrium points
It is known from the stability theorems of differential equations and properties of the ESS that the system must make x satisfying F(x)
¼ 0 and F'(x)0, and y satisfying F(y) ¼ 0 and F'(y)0, to achieve the ESS. On the basis of this theory, this paper provides a speciﬁc
analysis of the ESS for x and y.
4.1.1. ESS analysis of local governments
When F(x) ¼ 0, it can be obtained the equilibrium points x ¼ 0, x ¼ 1, andy ¼ AB (setting β ¼ AB, where β is an equilibrium point only if
0  β  1). Then, the following proposition can be concluded.
Proposition 1.

.

(1) When y¼β, it follows that F(x)0 and F'(x)0, then all strategies are at a steady state.
(2) When y6¼β, if supposing F(x)¼0, then x¼0 and x¼1 are the two stable points of x.
The following Proof 1 is given below for the above Proposition 1(2).
Proof 1. .
We discussed the following circumstances separately according to Equation (13):
(1) When A>B>0, then 0 < β < 1. The following two circumstances are analyzed and the phase diagram of replicator dynamics is shown in
Fig. 3a.
(i) When y<β, it can be inferred that Ay–B<0, F'(x)|x¼0<0, and F'(x)|x¼1>0, thus, x¼0 is the ESS.
(ii) When y>β, it can be inferred that Ay–B>0, F'(x)|x¼0>0, and F'(x)|x¼1<0, thus, x¼1 is the ESS.
(2) When A<B<0, then 0 < β < 1. The following two circumstances are discussed and the phase diagram of replicator dynamics is shown in
Fig. 3b.

Fig. 3. Phase diagrams of replicator dynamics of local governments. (a), x ¼ 0 is the evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) when y<β, and x ¼ 1 is the
ESS when y>β; (b), x ¼ 0 is the ESS when y>β, and x ¼ 1 is the ESS when y<β (β ¼ AB, where β is an equilibrium point only if 0  β  1). A represents
Equation (10); B represents Equation (11).
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(i) When y>β, it can be inferred that Ay–B<0, F'(x)|x¼0<0, and F'(x)|x¼1>0, thus, x¼0 is the ESS.
(ii) When y<β, it can be inferred that Ay–B>0, F'(x)|x¼0>0, and F'(x)|x¼1<0, thus, x¼1 is the ESS.

4.1.2. ESS analysis of residents
When F(y) ¼ 0, it can be obtained the equilibrium points y ¼ 0, y ¼ 1, andx ¼ DC (setting α ¼ DC, where α is an equilibrium point only if
0  α  1). Then, the following proposition can be concluded.
Proposition 2.

.

(1) When x¼α, it follows that F(y)0 and F'(y) 0, then all strategies are at a steady state.
(2) When x6¼α, if supposing F(y)¼0, then y¼0 and y¼1 are the two stable points of y.
The following Proof 2 is given below for the above Proposition 2(2).
Proof 2. .
We discussed the following circumstances separately according to Equation (22):
(1) When C>D>0, then 0 < α < 1. The following two circumstances are analyzed and the phase diagram of replicator dynamics is shown in
Fig. 4a.
(i) When x<α, it can be inferred that Cx–D<0, F'(y)|y¼0<0, and F'(y)|y¼1>0, thus, y¼0 is the ESS.
(ii) When x>α, it can be inferred that Cx–D>0, F'(y)|y¼0>0, and F'(y)|y¼1<0, thus, y¼1 is the ESS.
(2) When C<D<0, then 0 < α < 1. The following two circumstances are discussed and the phase diagram of replicator dynamics is shown in
Fig. 4b.
(i) When x>α, it can be inferred that Cx–D<0, F'(y)|y¼0<0, and F'(y)|y¼1>0, thus, y¼0 is the ESS.
(ii) When x<α, it can be inferred that Cx–D>0, F'(y)|y¼0>0, and F'(y)|y¼1<0, thus, y¼1 is the ESS.

4.2. Local asymptotic stability analysis of the evolutionary game model
Since x and y do not act separately in the complex evolutionary game model composed of local governments and residents, but
interact continuously in the system, it is necessary to explore the local asymptotic stability of the whole system in depth.
Here, let F(x) ¼ 0 and F(y) ¼ 0, then we can obtain the ﬁve equilibrium points of system (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1), and (α, β) (where
(α, β) is an equilibrium point only if 0  α  1 and 0  β  1). It is worth noting that not all of the above equilibrium points are the ESS,
since the ESS must also have the ability to resist errors or deviations caused by ﬁnite rationality, that is, it has the ability to restore
stability after being impacted by small disturbances (Friedman, 1991). Therefore, the analysis methods of local asymptotic stability are
proposed (Friedman, 1998), which can be used to determine whether the equilibrium points of the system are stable or not. Speciﬁcally,
the equilibrium point is the ESS, which must satisfy the condition that the determinant (Det J) is greater than 0 and the trace value (tr J)
is less than 0 for its Jacobi matrix (J); if Det J > 0 and tr J > 0, then the equilibrium point is an unstable point; and when the above
conditions are not satisﬁed, the equilibrium point is a saddle point.
According to Equations (12) and (21), the following J can be obtained:

Fig. 4. Phase diagram of replicator dynamics of residents. (a), y ¼ 0 is the ESS when x<α, and y ¼ 1 is the ESS when x>α; (b), y ¼ 0 is the ESS when
x>α, and y ¼ 1 is the ESS when x<α (α ¼ DC, where α is an equilibrium point only if 0  α  1). C represents Equation (19); D represents Equation (20).
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Fig. 5. ESS analysis for the ﬁve different cases (a–e) in which the initial values of x and y are set to 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8. t represents the length of a
time unit, i.e., the number of times the game is played.

2

∂FðxÞ
6 ∂x
6
J ¼6
4 ∂FðyÞ
∂x

3

∂FðxÞ
∂y 7
7


A11
7¼
A21
∂FðyÞ 5

 
A12
ð1  2xÞðAy  BÞ
¼
yð1  yÞC
A22


xð1  xÞA
:
ð1  2yÞðCx  DÞ

(23)

∂y

Accordingly, the Det J and the tr J are shown as follows:
Det J ¼ A11 A22  A12 A21 ¼ ð1  2xÞðAy  BÞ  ð1  2yÞðCx  DÞ  xð1  xÞA  yð1  yÞC;
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tr J ¼ A11 þ A22 ¼ ð1  2xÞðAy  BÞ þ ð1  2yÞðCx  DÞ:

(25)

To simplify the calculation, we assumed that: a1 ¼ –B, a2 ¼ A–B, a3 ¼ –D, and a4 ¼ C–D.
On the basis of the above conditions for the equilibrium point to be the ESS, as well as Equations (24) and (25), we can draw the local
asymptotic stability conditions for the equilibrium point of the model, as shown in Table 3.
It can be seen from Table 3 that (α, β) cannot evolve into the ESS in any conditions, while the other four equilibrium points may
evolve into the ESS under different parameter conditions. Depending on the range of values for different parameters obtained, the four
equilibrium points that may be the ESS are further explored in this paper, and the following six different cases of the ESS are concluded:
Case 1 when a1<0, a2<0, a3<0, and a4<0, the equilibrium point of the ESS is (0, 0).
Case 2 when a1>0, a2>0, a3<0, and a4<0, the equilibrium point of the ESS is (1, 0).
Case 3 when a1<0, a2<0, a3>0, and a4>0, the equilibrium point of the ESS is (0, 1).
Case 4 when a1>0, a2>0, a3>0, and a4>0, the equilibrium point of the ESS is (1, 1).
Case 5 when a1<0, a2>0, a3<0, and a4>0, the equilibrium points of the ESS are (0, 0) and (1, 1).
Case 6 when a1>0, a2<0, a3>0, and a4<0, the equilibrium points of the ESS are (0, 1) and (1, 0).
5. Results and discussion
The replicator dynamic equations and the ESS are the core concepts of EGT, which mainly describe the convergence process of the
system evolution to stable state. Local governments and residents calculate their payoffs according to the game rules, then update their
strategies by continuously comparing the payoffs, and eventually get a stable evolutionary trajectory of the system after repeated iterations over this process.
In order to more intuitively illustrate the speciﬁc effects of all the ESS cases and dynamic evolutionary mechanism on the evolutionary game model, this paper also conduct numerical simulation analysis to predict dynamical evolutionary game process.
Equations (8) and (17) in the evolutionary game model can be discretized as:
dxðtÞ
¼ xðtÞ½1  xðtÞ½AyðtÞ  B;
dt

(26)

dyðtÞ
¼ yðtÞ½1  yðtÞ½CxðtÞ  D:
dt

(27)

5.1. ESS analysis under different parameter conditions
According to Section 4.2, it is known that all four equilibrium points may evolve into the ESS under different parameter conditions.
Based on different basic costs of participants, this paper conducts the following numerical simulation analysis for all cases with the ESS
under different initial values according to Equations (26) and (27).
In addition, there are three main important conditions for setting parameters in numerical simulation process. Firstly, it should be
consistent with the range of parameters taken in different the ESS situations; secondly, it must be consistent with the realistic situations;
and ﬁnally, it should be able to highlight the different effects of different values on residents’ strategies within a reasonable scope.
Therefore, according to the above three requirements and referring to the relevant literature discussing parameter assignment methods
(Coyle, 2000), we can assume speciﬁc parameter values, as shown in Table 4.
According to the expressions of a1, a2, a3, and a4, in order to simplify the calculation, it can be assumed that:
Table 3
Analysis of local asymptotic stability for the equilibrium points.
Equilibrium point

(0, 0)
(1, 0)
(0, 1)
(1, 1)
(α, β)

A11

a1
–a1
a2
–a2
0

A12

0
0
0
0
α(1–α)A

A21

0
0
0
0
β(1–β)C

A22

a3
a4
–a3
–a4
0

Conditions of local asymptotic stability
Det J

tr J

Det J(0, 0)>0
Det J(1, 0)>0
Det J(0, 1)>0
Det J(1, 1)>0
α(1–α)A  β(1–β)C

tr J(0,
tr J(1,
tr J(0,
tr J(1,
0

Range of value
0)<0
0)<0
1)<0
1)<0

a1<0, a3<0
a1>0, a4<0
a2<0, a3>0
a2>0, a4>0
–

Note: “-” means non-existence (saddle point). a1 ¼ –B; a2 ¼ A–B; a3 ¼ –D; a4 ¼ C–D. Det J, determinant of Jacobi matrix; tr J, the trace value of Jacobi
matrix. A represents Equation (10); B represents Equation (11); C represents Equation (19); D represents Equation (20).
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Table 4
Parameter assignments under different cases of evolutionary stability strategy (ESS).
Situation

ESS

Conditions of the ESS

Image

λ1

λ2

δ

φ

ω

m

Case
Case
Case
Case
Case
Case

(0, 0)
(1, 0)
(0, 1)
(1, 1)
(0, 0) and (1, 1)
(0, 1) and (1, 0)

a1<0, a2<0,
a1>0, a2>0,
a1<0, a2<0,
a1>0, a2>0,
a1<0, a2>0,
a1>0, a2<0,

and a4<0
and a4<0
and a4>0
and a4>0
and a4>0
and a4<0

Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
–

0.5
0.3
0.5
0.3
0.4
–

0.5
0.8
0.5
0.8
0.4
–

0.49
0.49
0.49
0.49
0.49
–

0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
–

0.25
0.24
0.25
0.24
0.16
–

0.7
0.7
0.7
0.7
0.7
–

1
2
3
4
5
6

a3<0,
a3<0,
a3>0,
a3>0,
a3<0,
a3>0,

5a
5b
5c
5d
5e

Situation

C1

C2

D1

D2

R1(t)

R2

R3

R4

S1(t)

S2

S3

S4

F

Case
Case
Case
Case
Case
Case

9
5
9
5
6
–

5
5
3
3
4
–

3
3
3
3
3
–

4
4
4
4
5
–

4
4
4
4
4
–

3
3
3
3
3
–

4
4
4
4
4
–

6
6
6
6
6
–

3
3
3
3
3
–

2
2
2
2
2
–

6
3
6
3
3
–

4
7
4
7
4
–

2
2
2
2
2
–

1
2
3
4
5
6

Note: “-” means no data.

π 1 ¼  S3  δC2  ð1  λ2 ÞðD1  mFÞ þ λ2 ðR1 ðtÞ þ R2 þ S4 Þ 

λ1 ð1  λ2 Þ
;
ð1  λ1 ÞðS1 ðtÞ þ S2 Þ

(28)

π 2 ¼  S3  δC2 þ R1 ðtÞ þ R2 þ S4 þ S1 ðtÞ þ S2 :

(29)

π 3 ¼ ð1  f ÞR3 þ ð1  λ1 ÞðR4  D2 Þ þ λ1 mF;

(30)

π 4 ¼ ð1  f ÞR3 þ mF:

(31)

Case 1. If parameter values satisfy the conditions of C1>π 1 and C1>π 2 (i.e., a1<0 and a2<0), as well as C2>π 3 and C2>π 4 (i.e.,
a3<0 and a4<0), it means that the basic cost is at a high level for both local governments and residents when they are fully involved,
and the results of evolution are shown in Fig. 5a. It can be concluded that the ESS is (0, 0) for different initial proportion values. That
is, when the participation cost of both parties are at a high level, they both tend to reduce their actions to preserve their beneﬁts as
the system constantly evolves, i.e., their stable strategies incline to be “partial support and supervision” and “partial participation”.
Case 2. When parameter values satisfy the conditions of C1<π 1 and C1<π 2 (i.e., a1>0 and a2>0), as well as C2>π 3 and C2>π 4 (i.e.,
a3<0 and a4<0), it implies that when local governments and residents are fully involved, the basic costs are respectively low and
high, and the results of evolution are displayed in Fig. 5b. It can be seen that the ESS is (1, 0) for different initial probability values. In
other words, as the system evolves, when local governments can acquire corresponding beneﬁts through a low cost input, they are
more inclined to actively participate, i.e., “complete support and supervision”. However, when residents’ active participation require
high input costs, they tend to maintain their own beneﬁts by decreasing inputs, so their stable strategy is “partial participation”.
Case 3. If variables satisfy the conditions of C1>π 1 and C1>π 2 (i.e., a1<0 and a2<0), and C2<π 3 and C2<π 4 (i.e., a3>0 and a4>0),
it implies that the basic costs are respectively high and low when local governments and residents are fully involved, and the results
of evolution are shown in Fig. 5c. From the ﬁgure we can see that the ESS is (0, 1) for different initial probability values. That is, as
the system evolves, when residents can obtain the corresponding beneﬁts with a low cost investment, they are more inclined to
actively participate, i.e., “full participation”. When the high cost of participation is required by local governments, they tend to pay
less and the stable strategy is toward “partial support and supervision”.
Case 4. When parameter values satisfy the conditions of C1<π 1 and C1<π 2 (i.e., a1>0 and a2>0), and C2<π 3 and C2<π 4 (i.e., a3>0
and a4>0), it means that the basic cost is low for both local governments and residents when they are fully involved (see Fig. 5d). It
can be seen that, the ESS is (1, 1) for different initial probability values. In other words, when the participation cost of both parties are
at a low level, as the system evolves, both sides have a tendency to actively participate in the behavior, i.e., “complete support and
supervision” and “full participation”.
Case 5. If variables satisfy the conditions of π 1<C1<π 2 (i.e., a1<0 and a2>0) and π 3<C2<π 4 (i.e., a3<0 and a4>0), it means that
the basic cost is moderate when both local governments and residents are fully involved (see Fig. 5e). It is clear that the ESSs are both
(0, 0) and (1, 1) for different initial probability values. That is, when the costs to be paid by both sides of participants are at a medium
level, the behaviors of them will tend to be consistent with each other, i.e., the stable strategies are both toward “complete support
and supervision” and “full participation”, or “partial support and supervision” and “partial participation” at the same time.
Case 6. If parameter values satisfy the conditions π 2<C1<π 1 (i.e., a1>0 and a2<0) and π 4<C2<π 3 (i.e., a3>0 and a4<0), the ESSs
are both (0, 1) and (1, 0). But it is obvious from Equations (28) and (29) that π 1<π 2 is constant, so the above conditions cannot be
satisﬁed, that is, the ESS in this conditions does not exist.
From the ESS analysis of the above six cases, it can be seen that the cost investment and expected payoffs of both local governments
and residents will be out of balance when the basic costs shared by both participants are at a high level. At this moment, local
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governments and residents, through constantly observing and comparing their own payoffs, ﬁnally stabilize their strategies at “partial
support and supervision” and “partial participation”, respectively, in order to reduce losses. It is concluded that the high cost of investment is not favorable to the protection of traditional villages. In addition, the simulation results in different cases show that different
initial values of x and y do not impact the evolutionary results of the system, so initial values of x and y will be uniformly set to 0.5 in next
investigation of dynamic evolutionary mechanism.
5.2. Impacts of dynamic evolutionary mechanism on the results of the evolutionary game model
5.2.1. Impacts of λ₁ and λ2 on the results of the evolutionary game model
It is known from Section 3.1 that the evolutionary game model is greatly impacted by the subjective consciousness of the game
participants in evolution process, which means that λ1 and λ2 have a great inﬂuence on the results of the evolution game model.
When exploring the impacts of λ1 and λ2 on the evolutionary results of local governments’ strategies, it is required to change their
values and keep other parameters ﬁxed. Here, the assignment of other parameters can be referred to the Case 2 when the ESS is (1, 0).
Next, it is separated into three cases to explore, as shown in Fig. 6. Speciﬁcally, it is only when λ1 ¼ 0.2, 0.5, and λ2 ¼ 0.9, then x
converges to 1, otherwise it converges to 0. Keeping λ1 constant, it is easier for x to converge toward 0 with a smaller value of λ2. When
keeping λ2 constant, it is slower for x to converge toward 1 and faster for x to converge toward 0 with a larger value of λ1. In general, the
high levels of λ1 and λ2 will lead the evolution of x to converge toward 0 more easily.
According to the above simulation results, if both the intensity of local governments’ support and supervision and the degree of
residents’ participation (their self-consciousness) are at high levels, the ESS of both parties are partially involved. In the real situations,
there is not much mutual constraint between the two parties due to a high level of self-consciousness, so that local governments are more
willing to choose partial participation in the protection of traditional villages.
In order to analyze the impacts of λ1 and λ2 on the evolutionary results of local residents’ strategies, it is necessary to change their
values and keep other parameters unchanged. Similarly, the values of other parameters should be constant, and the assignment of them
can be referred to the Case 3 when the ESS is (0, 1) (taking φ ¼ 0.6 and m ¼ 0.5). Here, it is classiﬁed into three cases to discuss, as shown

Fig. 6. Impacts of λ1 (the intensity of local governments with support and supervision) and λ2 (the degree of residents with participation) on the
evolutionary results of local governments (focusing on exploring different convergence directions and speeds of curves). (a), λ1 ¼ 0.2 and λ2 ¼ 0.2,
0.5, and 0.9; (b), λ1 ¼ 0.5 and λ2 ¼ 0.2, 0.5, and 0.9; (c), λ1 ¼ 0.9 and λ2 ¼ 0.2, 0.5, and 0.9.
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in Fig. 7. Speciﬁcally, the value of λ1 increases from small to large, and y converges from 1 to 0; in addition, the smaller the λ2 is, the
faster the y converges to the stable point. It is clear that when the intensity of local governments’ support and supervision is high, the
strategy evolution results of residents will have a great similarity with local governments, and residents will reduce their own inputs and
gain high beneﬁts with partial participation. When the degree of residents’ participation is at a low level, residents also invest relatively
little in the protection of traditional villages, and thus their strategies stabilize faster.
5.2.2. Impacts of penalties and subsidies on the results of the evolutionary game model
The regulations on the protection of traditional villages promulgated by governments in China clearly stipulate that local governments should formulate reasonable penalties and increase subsidies to residents (State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2020).
Consequently, penalties and subsidies are important factors to impact the decision-making of participants. This paper further explores
the impacts of m and δ on the results of the evolutionary game model in detail.
To explore the impacts of m on the results of the evolutionary game model, the assignment of other parameters can be referred to the
Case 2 when the ESS is (1, 0) (where the value of F is modiﬁed to 4) and m takes different values. The evolutionary results are shown in
Fig. 8. The results show that the value of m changes from large to small and the convergence values of both x and y change from 1 to 0,
indicating that the smaller value the m is, the easier and faster the x and y converge to 0, that is, the strategies of both parties tend to be
“partially support and supervision” and “partially participation”, respectively.
The smaller value of m means the lower intensity of penalties imposed, which shows that low penalties do not have a good deterrent
effect on the destruction of traditional villages. In contrast, the relevant laws and regulations on the protection of traditional villages
promulgated in China put forward deﬁnite requirements for penalties mechanism, which demands each local government to establish
comprehensive regulations and implement reasonable ﬁnes, early warnings, and withdrawal mechanisms (Ministry of Housing and
Urban-Rural Development, 2014). Therefore, local governments can improve penalty mechanism by increasing penalties, and expand
deterrent effect of penalty mechanism on the subjects of the evolutionary game model.
When exploring the impacts of δ on the evolutionary results of local governments’ strategies, the assignment of other parameters can
be referred to the Case 3 when the ESS is (0, 1) and δ takes different values. The evolutionary results are shown in Fig. 9a. According to

Fig. 7. Impacts of λ1 and λ2 on the evolutionary results of residents (focusing on exploring different convergence directions and speeds of curves). (a),
λ1 ¼ 0.1 and λ2 ¼ 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9; (b), λ1 ¼ 0.5 and λ2 ¼ 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9; (c), λ1 ¼ 0.9 and λ2 ¼ 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9.
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Fig. 8. Impacts of m (the probability of penalties imposed by local governments with complete support and supervision on residents with partial
participation) on the evolutionary results of local governments (a) and residents (b) (focusing on exploring different convergence directions and
speeds of curves).

Fig. 9. The impact of δ (the proportion of subsidies provided by local governments to residents with complete support and supervision) (a) and D1
(the maximum remedial cost that needs to be paid by local governments with complete support and supervision) (b) on the evolutionary results of
local governments’ strategies (focusing on exploring different convergence directions and speeds of curves).

the results, the value of δ changes from large to small and the convergence value of x varies from 0 to 1, indicating that the smaller the δ
is, the easier the x converges to 1 and the faster it converges, that is, the smaller the proportion of subsidies provided by local governments for residents, the more the local governments’ strategies will lean toward “complete support and supervision”.
The more subsidies the local governments need to provide for residents to participate in the protection of traditional villages, the
more funds need to invest, which will inevitably lead to a signiﬁcant loss of beneﬁts. Therefore, local governments will adopt “partial
support and supervision” to reduce inputs and prevent losses. Fundamentally, the lack of funds is the main reason triggering this
problem. Accordingly, local governments can solve the problem by encouraging social forces to participate in the protection of traditional villages and prevent the damage to traditional villages because of the inability on providing sufﬁcient subsidies for residents.
5.2.3. Impact of D1 on the evolutionary results of local governments’ strategies
For some traditional villages destroyed due to insufﬁcient protection, local governments have set up a public welfare program for the
restoration of traditional building, which is used for the construction of villages’ facilities and the restoration of heritage buildings.
Therefore, D1 has an important impact on the decision-making of local governments.
When exploring the impact of D1, the assignment of other parameters can be referred to the Case 2 when the ESS is (1, 0) and the
value of D1 is modiﬁed. The evolutionary results are shown in Fig. 9b. When the value of D1 is too large, the convergence value of x
changes from 1 to 0, that is, strategies of local governments adjust from “complete support and supervision” to “partial support and
supervision”. In other words, if the remedial cost of local governments is too high, they will avoid losses by reducing their actions, so that
the high level of remedial cost is not beneﬁcial to the protection of traditional villages.
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5.2.4. Impacts of R1(t) and S1(t) on the evolutionary results of local governments’ strategies
“Rational utilization of cultural heritage, the exploitation of social and emotional values, and the continuation and expansion of
usage function” is clearly put forward in the regulations on the protection of traditional villages in China (Ministry of Housing and
Urban-Rural Development, 2014), which means that traditional villages have the inestimable values of culture, history, and landscape.
Hence, R1(t) and S1(t) have a great inﬂuence on the decision-making behavior of local governments.
It is needed to change the value of R1(t) when exploring the impact of R1(t); here, the assignment of other parameters can be referred
to the Case 2 when the ESS is (1, 0). The evolution results are shown in Fig. 10a. When the value of R1(t) changes from large to small, the
convergence value of x varies from 1 to 0, which indicates that the smaller the value of R1(t) is, the easier it is for x to converge to 0 and
the faster the converge speed is, that is, local governments’ strategies adjust from “complete support and supervision” to “partial support
and supervision”. In other words, the smaller the revenue generated by local cultural development, the less motivation of local governments are to participate in the protection of traditional villages.
When exploring the impact of S1(t), the other parameters can be referred to the Case 3 when the ESS is (0, 1) and the value of S1(t) is
modiﬁed. The evolution results are shown in Fig. 10b. The convergence value of x changes from 0 to 1 when the value of S1(t) varies
from small to large, which indicates that the larger the value of S1(t) is, the easier it is for x to converge to 1 and the faster the converge
speed is, that is, local governments’ strategies adjust from “partial support and supervision” to “complete support and supervision”. This
also implies that the greater losses caused to local governments by the destruction of traditional villages, the more willing local governments are to avoid greater losses through active participation.
5.2.5. Impact of taxation on the evolutionary results of residents’ strategies
The interaction between local governments and residents is mainly in the form of taxation, and the payment of taxation has a great
impact on the overall beneﬁts of residents. Thus, it is necessary to further study φ and R3.
When exploring the impact of φ on the evolutionary results of residents’ strategies, the assignment of other parameters can be
referred to the Case 1 when the ESS is (0, 0) and the value of φ changes. The evolution results are shown in Fig. 11a. The convergence
value of y changes from 1 to 0 when the value of φ varies from small to large, indicating that the larger the value of φ is, the easier and
faster the y converges to 0. Accordingly, the higher the taxation residents have to pay, the more their strategies tend to be “partial
participation” in order to reduce the losses of their own interests, which corresponds to the taxation incentives previously implemented
in China.
When exploring the impact of R3 on the evolutionary results of residents’ strategies, the assignment of other parameters can be
referred to the Case 1 when the ESS is (0, 0), and the value of R3 changes. The evolution results are shown in Fig. 11b. The convergence
value of y varies from 0 to 1 when the value of R3 increases from small to large, indicating that the larger value of R3 is, the easier and
faster the y converges toward 1. That is, when the direct economic beneﬁts of residents are at a high level, residents are more likely to
enhance their economic beneﬁts through “full participation”.
5.2.6. Impact of resistance behaviors on the results of the evolutionary game model
Resistance is a classical feedback behavior, which arises mainly because actor damages the interests of the other party by certain
actions. If local governments do not completely support and supervise the protection of villages, the self-interests of residents will be
damaged to a certain degree, then they will effectively limit the behaviors of local governments by adopting appropriate resistance as
feedback. The occurrence of resistance behaviors generates the net beneﬁts for residents (R4–D2) and causes the losses for local governments (S4).
In order to explore the impact of D2 on the evolutionary results of residents’ strategies, the assignment of other parameters can be

Fig. 10. Impacts of R1(t) (the maximum local cultural development beneﬁts obtained by local governments with full participation of the residents)
(a) and S1(t) (the maximum local cultural development losses suffered by local governments with partial participation of residents) (b) on the
evolutionary results of local governments’ strategies (focusing on exploring different convergence directions and speeds of curves).
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Fig. 11. Impacts of φ (the taxation rates of residents) (a) and R3 (the direct economic beneﬁts of residents with full participation) (b) on the
evolutionary results of residents’ strategies (focusing on exploring different convergence directions and speeds of curves).

referred to the Case 1 when the ESS is (0, 0), and the value of D2 changes. The evolution results are shown in Fig. 12a. It is observed that y
converges from 0 to 1 when the value of D2 varies from large to small, indicating that the smaller the D2 value is, the easier and faster y
converges to 1. That is, when the cost of resistance is at a low level, resistance will bring greater net beneﬁts and the strategies of
residents will be more inclined to “full participation”.
When the impact of S4 on the evolutionary results of local governments’ strategies is explored, the values of S4 are changed and the
other parameters are constant. Here, other parameters are λ1 ¼ 0.1, λ2 ¼ 0.9, δ ¼ 0.49, φ ¼ 0.3, m ¼ 0.7, C1 ¼ 5, C2 ¼ 3, D1 ¼ 3, D2 ¼ 4,
R1(t) ¼ 4, R2 ¼ 2, R3 ¼ 4, R4 ¼ 6, S1(t) ¼ 1, S2 ¼ 1, S3 ¼ 4, and F ¼ 2, and the evolution results are shown in Fig. 12b. The convergence
value of x varies from 0 to 1 when the value of S4 changes from small to large, indicating that the larger the value of S4 is, the easier and
faster the x converges toward to 1, i.e., strategies of local governments adjust from “partial support and supervision” to “complete
support and supervision”. If S4 becomes larger, it means that local governments will suffer a lot of losses once resistance behavior occurs,
at this time, local governments are more inclined to take positive actions to reduce the possibility of great losses caused by resistance
behaviors.
6. Conclusions and suggestions
6.1. Summary conclusions
Taking the complex social issue on the protection of traditional villages as the entry point, this paper constructs an evolutionary game
model including two stakeholders (local governments and residents) under the premise that the interests of local governments and
residents inﬂuence and constrain mutually, and explores the evolutionary process and trend of regulatory strategies regarding the
protection of traditional villages.

Fig. 12. Impacts of D2 (the cost of resistance for residents) (a) and S4 (the losses of resistance for local governments) (b) on the results of the
evolutionary game model (focusing on exploring different convergence directions and speeds of curves).
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The strategic evolution is a dynamic process of mutual inﬂuence, constant adjustment and optimization, which can converge to the
stable state under certain conditions. In addition, both the results and speed of strategic evolution demonstrate a consistent interdependence. By analyzing the real situations, the necessary conditions to facilitate the more rapid convergence of stakeholders’ strategies
toward the ideal state can be obtained, which means that the research can predict the long-term trend of the strategy evolution of
participants in the protection of traditional villages. The decision-making of participants mainly depends on the basic cost required to
participate in the protection of traditional villages. When the basic cost paid by both stakeholders exceeds a certain threshold, the cost
inputs and expected beneﬁts will be imbalanced. In this situation, the difﬁculties for local governments to implement support and
supervision will increase dramatically and the participation of residents will be greatly hindered, which intensify the conﬂicts between
stakeholders and are not conducive to the protection of traditional villages.
The direction and speed of decision-making for local governments and residents depend mainly on the changes of internal and
external factors, including the intensity of support and supervision, the degree of participation, subsidies and penalties, resistance and
other behaviors. These dynamic changes of inﬂuencing factors will impact the stakeholders to different degrees, which can provide a
scientiﬁc evidence for both sides of the game to effectively limit the decision-making of each other.
6.2. Suggestions
To effectively promote the implementation of the protection of traditional villages, we proposed the following suggestions and
recommendations.
(1) In the protection of traditional villages, the behavior of one party will inevitably impact the decision-making of the other party, as
well as their own rights and beneﬁts. Consequently, it is important for local governments and residents to consider the impacts of
their own strategies to the other party in the decision-making process, which can avoid losses due to wrong decisions. In addition,
local governments and residents can preset an ideal state of their own strategies and then adopt the evolutionary game model to
calculate the reasonable scope of various behaviors that can achieve the expected ideal stable state.
(2) With regard to the impact of basic cost on the decision-making of stakeholders, local governments can establish additional thirdparty supervision mechanisms, such as public media and non-governmental organizations, which can not only supplement supervision actions that local governments need to pay, but also effectively improve the overall supervision efﬁciency of society. In
addition, local governments can also guide social forces to participate in the protection of traditional villages through donation or
investment, which can thus supplement the enforcement cost of local governments. As for residents, the cost of investment can be
reduced by improving the conscientiousness of traditional village protection and reducing damages to traditional villages; besides, the rational use of traditional village resources can obtain additional income as a supplement.
(3) From the perspective of local governments, the factors that impact the decision-making mainly include the intensity of support
and supervision, the proportion of subsidies, the intensity of penalties, the amount of taxation, and the losses of resistance, so
that, these aspects should be considered primarily when formulating regulations related to the protection of traditional villages.
To begin with, local governments should play a leadership role and raise the awareness of grassroots ofﬁcials about the value of
traditional villages, which can not only improve the strength of support and supervision by raising the consciousness of protection, but also increase the revenue of local cultural development and reduce the risk of resistance by residents correspondingly.
Secondly, local governments should actively improve the system of subsidies and penalties. Subsidies are incentives to mobilize
the enthusiasm of residents, and local governments can increase the proportion of subsidies and reduce the costs by guiding the
participation of social forces. Further, penalties can effectively restrict residents who violate the protection regulations, so local
governments should give full play to deterrent the effect of penalties by increasing the intensity of penalties. In addition,
reasonable subsidies and penalties should be established to keep them in an excellent balance, so that they can better play a
positive role.
(4) As for residents, they are the implementers of speciﬁc actions in the protection process of traditional villages, and their strategies
have a direct impact on the development directions of traditional villages. The factors impacting the decision-making of residents
mainly include the degree of participation, penalties, policies on taxation, and resistance behaviors, therefore, it is essential for
residents to consider fully the speciﬁc inﬂuence of above-mentioned factors in their decision-making. First of all, whether
traditional villages can be protected well or not is closely related to the awareness of residents, which is an urgent need to
improve. To this end, local governments should strengthen the cultural popularization of residents to make them fully aware of
the cultural value of traditional villages. For residents, it can not only effectively improve the degree of participation and raise the
direct economic beneﬁts, but also minimize the negative effects of penalties imposed by local governments. In the second place,
the taxation of residents is a key factor inﬂuencing on their revenues, so local governments should actively implement taxation
incentives to increase the overall revenues of residents and mobilize their enthusiasm. Eventually, resistance is a reasonable
approach for residents to preserve their own interests, which can be implemented in a reasonable way to effectively limit the
leading role of local governments over residents and avoid being in a completely passive position with losses of their own rights
and interests.
(5) One of the important advantages of the research method used in this paper is that it can eliminate abrupt changes in the system
and is stable, so the small disturbances in the system do not have signiﬁcant impact on the ﬁnal decision-making results. For
traditional villages that are currently doing well in protection, when there is a sudden change in one or more relevant inﬂuence
factors, such as a sudden increase in cost, the results of this study can be used to guide stakeholders quickly and accurately to ﬁnd
new optimal solutions, through the combination of game model and simulation analysis.
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6.3. Limitations
This paper focuses on the protection of traditional villages, but the research on traditional villages is not limited to the aspect of
protection. The development and utilization of traditional villages are equally important. Moreover, it is difﬁcult to keep a balance
between the protection and tourism development of traditional villages, which is also an overwhelming problem limiting the development of traditional villages in recent years. Accordingly, research in the future can consider adopting EGT to solve the conﬂict
relationship between the protection and tourism development of traditional villages, as well as construct a comprehensive interest
coordination mechanism by introducing the third-party stakeholder, which will be more beneﬁcial to deal with the relationship between
economic development and cultural heritage.
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